Earnings Management of Quoted Corporate Firms: Detecting and Rethinking the Key Drivers in an Insensitive Capital Market as a Panacea for Investors’ Resource Abuse by Joseph. N, Chukwuma, et al.
European Journal of Business and Management 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.20, 2015 
www.iiste.org 
185 
 
 
 
Earnings Management of Quoted Corporate Firms: Detecting and 
Rethinking the Key Drivers in an Insensitive Capital Market as a Panacea 
for Investors’ Resource Abuse 
Chukwuma, Joseph. N
1
; Asogwa, Cosmas, I.
2
; Ezeji, Helen, A
1
; Uzuagu, Anthonia.U
1
 
 
1. Department of Vocational Teacher Education, University of Nigeria Nsukka, Nigeria; 
2. Accounting Researching Scholar @Department of Accounting, University Of Nigeria, Nsukka; 
, 
Abstract 
 
Both mechanistic and positive accounting theories were postulated to explain the drivers of earnings 
management. Scholars postulated the theories perhaps under the belief that market would always be sensitive to 
firm performance reports. Since the emergence of these theories, many empirical researches have been based on 
such a framework. They found that positive relationship exists between capital market and earnings 
management. The key questions we want to address in this present study is whether the direction will remain 
unaltered if market goes insensitive. In addition, if it has altered, what key factors could determine earnings 
management in the turn of the market? Given that some developing economies capital markets are now 
insensitive to performance stimuli for over a long period, the reality of metrics constituting the real drivers of 
earnings management needs rethinking for avoidance of investors’ resource misallocation. In this study, we 
examined variables that could really constitute the key drivers using a cross-sectional survey research design in 
an insensitive market among the quoted firms in Nigeria. We analyzed data we obtained from survey using 
logistic regression model, which helped us to detect earnings management maximum likelihood in an insensitive 
stock market. The result revealed that market capitalization and compensation contracting based on share options 
negatively drive managers to engage in earnings management as opposed to mechanistic theories if market turns 
insensitive to performance. However, non- market based factors including debt covenant, compensation based on 
cash options, loss deletion and regulation positively drive managers to engage in earnings management practices 
whether market is sensitive or insensitive to performance report. Therefore, we found the key drivers of earnings 
management in an insensitive market to constitute non-market based compensation incentives. We recommend 
that in order to encourage earnings quality and eschew investors’ resource misallocation, earnings management 
containment based on the efficient, sensitive market premises should be reviewed, and emphasis should be 
placed on non-market based containment strategies. 
 
Key Words: Earnings; Earnings Management; Drivers, Market Capitalization; Market Sensitivity; Capital 
Market Insensitivity 
 
1.1Introduction 
we seek empirical evidence through this study whether in an emerging insensitive capital market, the drivers of 
earnings management could take a different direction or dimension compared to when the market is efficient and 
sensitive to firm performance. This evidence will be very essential for making containment recommendations 
considering the fact that anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that earnings management drivers were at the root 
of failures of several corporate firms such as Enron, and WorldCom that eroded away huge investors’ hard- 
earned resources (Fernandez and Garcia, 2007; Raymond et al, 2015). It is unfortunate anyway,  that this 
occurred perhaps due to sketchy and scanty knowledge of earnings management key drivers existing under 
different market conditions. In Nigeria particularly, where we took our evidence, firms crumbled due to these 
phenomenon, which according to Schipper (1989) is a kind of manager intervention in external-financial 
reporting process to appropriate self-gain. Evidently, most investors under this covert intervention lost over 70% 
of their stakes in the market. Shareholders of some banks such as Oceanic Bank of Nigeria, Bank PHB and 
Afribank lost 100% of their share capital to the earnings hocus-pocus behaving managers. Most of these failures 
occurred when market was highly sensitive to firm performance. Starting from the post failures periods, most 
studies on the phenomenon have been directed towards determining the real drivers mainly under the framework 
of sensitive capital market behavior. But in this study, we make a difference by determining the drivers from the 
context of market insensitivity since market is taking a southward direction particularly in Nigeria. This change 
in market from bullish to bearish state can redefine earnings management drivers. Our ultimate aim is to 
determine whether the factors that drove earnings management during uptrend market could still constitute key 
drivers or whether those ones that were not the focus points are now turning to key drivers. We fear that unless 
this is determined, containment strategies would be impaired and investors’ resources will remain at stake. 
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The reason why previous scholars embed their researches from the framework of market insensitivity is not 
farfetched. Scholars have been motivated to take this line of action involving determining earnings management 
from the context of market sensitivity, first, because earlier studies prior to the market bubbles such as 
Mechanistic Accounting Theory (MAT) of Ball (1972) postulate that firms in capital market can systematically 
misdirect investors in the market because those investors do not utilize information sources apart from that 
provided by the reporting firms. Second, although in an efficient and sensitive capital market, firms’ information 
made available to the public is already incorporated into market stock prices and as such, investors cannot be 
misled by such information (Farma, 1970; Gilson and Kraakman, 1984), investors can largely be irrational in 
stock pricing. They can always depart from the fundamentals to price stock sometimes abnormally based on 
emerging market information (Nwude 2012). From these perspectives, researchers have always found market  as 
a comfort framework to assess the motivation behind earnings management behavior since managers could 
engineer profit to redirect market focus for abnormal stock pricing for their private interests. Evidence of this can 
be found in the earnings management studies of Ramzi (2009), Lanouar, et al (2013), and Kothari et al (2005). In 
these, studies market capitalization, share options and expectations were found to be the key drivers behind 
managers’ earnings management practices. This implies that managers’ management of earnings is largely 
dependent on the ability of market to reflect their actions. However, since the global capital meltdown, most 
emerging economies’ capital markets such as Nigerian stock market has turned inefficiently insensitive (Nwude, 
2012). This development now raises a question. Does the contemporary market insensitivity provide a different 
set of incentives for earnings management? While this question remains, it is evident that according to Nwude 
(2012), the market bubbles for instance in Nigeria resulted in over 70% capital erosion, which must have caused 
the players in the capital market arena to become extremely bearish not exhibiting any bullish attitude despite 
huge profit report or high operational savings display as before. This shows perhaps an absolute loss of 
confidence in the capital market due to the capital loss wounds. Consequently, market insensitivity followed due 
to market participants’ departures from the fundamentals. Following such bubbles, there has been a continual 
dwindling of firms’ values based on market capitalization. This is despite the fact that firms’ performances have 
not been plummeting. Using insensitivity in this context to mean market’s inability to respond particularly 
positively to performance information as against the basic postulation of MAT, and Farma, (1970) and Gilson 
and Kraakman, (1984) efficient market theory, we doubt if the previous market tied variables that affect 
managers earnings hocus pocus still stand. 
 
Therefore, based on this existing market reality, the need to detect and rethink earnings management 
determinants within the context other than market sensitivity has emerged particularly in developing economies 
and those economies where market has failed or market lies at the bottom or is trending downward. Otherwise, 
we fear that the containment strategies that work for sensitive market may be engaged in checking earnings 
management behavior of managers in an insensitive market. Take for instance; auditors may focus on market 
tied compensation such as market capitalization and equity options to monitor managers’ earnings behavior 
without knowing that these no longer constitute incentives to them in managing earnings. Based on this, the key 
emerging question and issue we want to address is whether the market-based compensation factors such as share 
options, equity capitalization, and share based compensation contracts adjudged in an efficient sensitive capital 
market as key drivers of earnings management still drive managements’ propensity to manage earnings. 
Specifically, we raised the following critical research questions. Does market-capitalization influence 
management’s desire to engage in discretion accounting in an insensitive capital market? To what extent does 
compensation contracting based on share price or options influence earnings management in a market that is no 
longer sensitive? Do debt covenant, regulation, loss mitigation possibility and cash compensation based on 
earnings target contracting, influence corporate firms’ earnings management where capital market is insensitive 
to performance? What are the effective earnings-management containment strategies applicable in an insensitive 
capital market? These for us are critical emerging questions around earnings management and they constitute 
gaps in literature as far as the market remains insensitive, which if not bridged could definitely encourage 
resource misallocation among investors. We provided answers to these questions and to have successfully 
achieved these, we deviated from the usual Ex-Post factor analysis of accrual and real activity manipulation 
regression using historical and discretionary accounting data. We engaged the instrument of survey, which 
enabled us to dig and search deeply the presence of earnings management maximum likelihood using multiple 
logistic regressions. We report that from the context of market insensitivity, market capitalization, share options 
and equity based compensation plans do not constitute among the key drivers of firms’ earnings management 
contrary to general belief that market based incentives always constitute key determinants of earnings 
management. However, debt covenant, loss mitigation, regulation and cash based compensation still constitute 
key drivers of earnings management when market is both sensitive and insensitive. We recommend a rethink of 
containment strategies from both the context of sensitive and insensitive capital market. Therefore, to the best of 
our  knowledge,  no  study  in  Nigeria  has  provided  substantial  answers  regarding  the  drivers  of     earnings 
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management from the context of market insensitivity using survey instrument as we have done. We are the first 
to analyze earnings management drivers from the context other than market efficiency differentiating how 
mangers respond to earnings management between efficient and inefficient market. From all ramifications, we 
made big contribution to literature on earnings management. 
 
The remaining part of the paper is organized thus: section 2, deals with literature and hypotheses development, 
section 3 deals with methodology, while we dealt with result and discussion, and conclusion and 
recommendation in sections 4 and 5 respectively. 
 
 Literature and Hypotheses Development 
 
 Conceptual Framework 
 
According to Lev (1989), earnings sometime called the bottom line or net income are the single most important 
item in financial statements. They according to him indicate the extent to which a company has engaged in value 
added activities. They are a signal according to him that helps direct resource allocation in capital markets. In 
fact, the theoretical value of a company’s stock is the present value of its future earnings. Increased earnings 
represent an increase in company value, while decrease in earnings signal a decrease in that value (Lev, 1989). 
Little wonder then earnings have drawn attention of scholars over the years. Earnings are company’s omen. It 
could portray how good or bad a company may be in the near future. The importance of earnings to firms’ 
reputation cannot be overemphasized. Little wonder firms’ has used various methods to display positively their 
profitability performance. The use of methods to display positively firms’ earnings is regarded as  kind of 
earnings management. Earnings management has been described by so many names such as: Income Smoothing, 
Accounting hocus-pocus, Financial Statement Management, The Numbers Game, Aggressive Accounting, 
Reengineering the Income Statement, Juggling the Books, Creative Accounting, Borrowing Income from the 
Future, Banking Income for the Future, Financial Shenanigans, Window Dressing and Accounting Alchemy. 
Projection of a company’s earnings to achieve a purpose usually of self-interest is earnings management. 
According to Schipper (1989), earnings management is a kind of manager intervention in external-financial 
reporting process to appropriate self-gain. According to Alexandra (2006), earnings management is the 
manipulation of accounts and financial reports by a firm’s management in order to present a view of the 
company, which does not accurately reflect its financial position or performance. It is often according to him 
refered to as creative accounting, and is blamed for the downfall of companies such as Enron and WorldCom, 
yet earnings management techniques may range from being deliberately conservative in nature, to blatant 
violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Practices and fraud. According to Vinciguerra (2004), there appear 
to be no one acceptable definition of earnings management due to the fact that it is considered a difficult concept 
to define and measure. Most definitions are based on the understanding of the motivating factor behind earnings 
management. For Healy and Wahley (1999), earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports either to mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting number. From the definition, the driving force behind earnings management is to mislead 
investors and that is principally achieved by engineering the accounting figures. Earnings management is all 
about book cooking. Although in some cases, the practice may mean good for the investors, yet it has an 
underlying deception. Potential investors according to extant literatures are being drawn to overprice the shares 
of the earnings-managing firms. 
 
 Theoretical Framework, Empirical Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Quoting Dechow and Skinner (2000) from Ramzi (2009), earnings management practices are directly linked to 
the accrual based accounting. Apart from accrual based earnings management, scholars have also detected 
earnings management through real activity manipulations (Roychowdhury 2006). Accrual accounting gives the 
managers the opportunity to create fictitious profits, hence an opportunity also to manage earnings. Because of 
their position as preparers of financial statements, they can report income that does not exist and this no doubt 
could enhance their position fraudulently especially where their pay packages are tied to high profit 
achievement. In fact, corporate managers can use the managerial latitude to maximize their own interests, 
sometimes at the expense of shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders’ wealth (Ramzi, 2009). Maximizing 
self-interests in this context is the overall end for earnings management. The choice according to Ramzi, (2009) 
of the moment when revenues and charges are recorded creates a variation that constitutes the difference 
between cash and accrual based accounting. In this theoretical framework, we consider the factors that determine 
firms’ propensity to engage in earnings management under the framework of capital market and non-market 
based. 
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Studies by Subhrendu and lan (2008) show that early literature focus on earnings management was primarily on 
the impact of accounting choices on the capital market. There were two competing hypotheses in this regards. 
One is the mechanistic hypothesis and the other is the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The mechanistic hypothesis 
postulates firms earnings management can systematically misdirect investors because they do not utilize 
information sources apart from that provided by the reporting firm (Ball 1972). On the contrary, the efficient 
market hypothesis postulates that discretion accounting of managers cannot systematically mislead investors 
because stocks already reflected all available information (Fama, 1970). However, because earlier hypothesis 
failed to provide valid explanations of the motivation factors behind earnings management, positive accounting 
theory was developed by Watts and Zimmerman (1986), which shifted emphasis from capital market earnings 
research based on non-market internal compensation contractual perspective. This shift according to Subhrendu 
and lan (2008), did not also provide answers to reasons behind earnings management. Therefore, earnings 
management drivers have returned to market based. Studies by Teoh et al (1998a) reveal that capital market  has 
a role to play in determining the level of earnings management played by managers. 
 
However, despite controversies, several theories have provided explanations of what make firms engage in 
earnings management. According to Lanouar et al (2013), politico-contractual theory by Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986) provides several explanations to the determinants of earnings management in an efficient capital market. 
Among such factors is a bonus plan for managers. Their theory shows that bonus-plan hypothesis supposes that 
managers apply accounting policies that enable them to satisfy their interests by postponing the results of future 
periods to the current one. They observed that the adoption of executive compensation policy that is linked to 
performance is geared towards encouraging managers to decision serving shareholders’ interest. However, 
according to Lanouar et al (2013), such a compensation policy may not achieve the intended aim because of the 
opportunistic disposition of managers. At the end, the policy would be counterproductive to investors’ interest. 
Empirically, positive relationship has been found to exist between earnings management when the bonus is 
between the upper and lower limit. This relationship can be found in the work of Healy (1985). Apart from 
bonus-tied compensation as a determinant factor of earnings management, companies can also act on managerial 
ownership by adopting a strategy compensation based on options and equities. Share options contract could drive 
management to engage in earnings management. Evidence from Yermack (1997) revealed that managers 
manipulate accounting and financial information when compensation is based on stock options. Therefore, to get 
more options, directors tend to influence their compensation criteria by cooking accounting figures. 
 
In a positive accounting theory of Watts and Zimmerman (1986), market capitalization is shown to have a 
positive relationship with firms’ propensity to engage in earnings management. This is since earnings 
management can be used according to Lanouar et al, (2013), from informative perspective. Thus according to 
Healy and Palepu (1995), earnings management is considered by managers as a means to signal to investors their 
expectations about the future. Scholars have indeed found firm size to be positively related to earnings 
management. When measuring a firm, shareholders depend on accounting information made available on stock 
market. Degeorge et al (1999) found that directors are motivated to engage in creative accounting to influence 
share prices, which they do according to Graham et al (2005) to hit a targeted level of share price. Capital market 
is therefore a motivation for earnings management. According to Erickson et al (1999) as quoted Alexandra 
(2006), the usage of accounting information contained in financial reports has led some academics  to 
hypothesize that managers use earnings management with goal of influencing the firms’ short-term stock price. 
A number of studies have been undertaken in this area, examining the practice of earnings management in 
various situations. They maintain that one of the most significant motivations for earnings management for 
capital market reasons is to encourage investment in a firm, through offering of stock. Research by Erickson 
(1999) as cited in Alexandra (2006) shows that firms report positive unexpected accruals, which increase income 
before initial public offers, seasoned equity offers as reported by Toeh et al (1998) in Alexandra (2006)  and 
stock financed acquisitions. To ensure common interest between different stakeholders, firms can act on 
managerial ownership by adopting a strategy compensation based on options and equity (Lanouar et al, 2013). 
When the number of shares held by the leader increases, this could motivate manager to act in the interest of the 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This implies that manager can also engage earnings management to 
engineer earnings when compensation is based on share options or equity values. In all these situations, earnings 
management has a purpose. It is used as a means of presenting financial statements in a rosy perspective so as to 
attract the goodwill of investors over the firms’ stocks in the market. When the goodwill is captured, it would 
translate in stock overvaluation by the unsuspecting investors. Theory also shows that managers go for 
accounting choices that permit them to shift profits in future periods to current period by making a high debt to 
equity ratio (Lanouar, et al 2013). Watts and Zimmerman (1986) maintained that managers are moved to 
engineer accounting information when they are close the limit set by the creditors. This is called debt-covenant 
hypothesis. This according to Xiong (2006) is based on the fact that lenders often impose restrictions on the 
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payment of dividends, share buyouts and the issuing of additional debt in term of accounting figures and ratios to 
ensure the repayment of the firms’ indebtedness. Therefore, the proposition is that firms that have many debt 
covenants have an incentive to commit earnings management so that they do not transgress on the terms of the 
covenant according Xiong (2006). Apart from debt covenant, firms can be driven to earnings management by the 
desire to cover loss report. Degeorge et al (1999), found that it is essential for firms not to make losses and to 
achieve consistent growth. This is since according to Barth et al (1999), reporting continuous earnings growth is 
directly proportional to the pricing of a firm’s premium. This provides support according to Alexandra (2006)  to 
the loss cover hypothesis. Indeed, according to Lanouar et al (2013) some researchers argue that the preservation 
of reputation reflected on positive earnings report is also a motivation earnings management. Hence, according 
to them, some managers manage earnings upward for fear of being dismissed as a result of poor performance. 
The prevailing hypothesis in this regard is that firms with low performance are more intended to manage 
earnings. This proposition is expected to yield a positive relationship between the variables. in this matter of 
drivers of earnings management, regulation has also come to fore. Regulation is expected to play a role either 
positively or negatively. Positively for instance because, firms can increase earnings to meet up the equity 
requirement for listings in a stock market or for receiving assistance from the government or to meet up with 
minimum capitalization for licensing as in the case of banks. On the other hand, it could encourage downsizing 
of profit as means of tax evasion or avoidance. Healy and Wahlen (1999) noted that industries in particular the 
banking, insurance and utiliy industries are monitored for compliance with regulations linked to accounting 
figures and ratios. Alexandra (2006) observed that banks and insurance firms are often subject to requirements 
that they have enough capital or assets to meet their liabilities, while utilities are often only permited to earn a 
normal return on their investments, thus leading to theory that such regulations give managers incentives to use 
earnings management. 
 
Over all, empirically, Ramzi (2009) taking samples from French firms found positive relationship between 
market size and earnings management of firms. He concluded that the larger the company, the  more the 
corporate managers tend to adjust earnings upwards. In consistent with the positive accounting theory, Lanouar 
(2013) found market capitalization in Tunisia positive and significant. Study by Yermack (1997) discovered that 
managers influence earnings to attract more options. Ramzi (2009) also found that debt covenant in among 
French firms negatively affected earnings management. This result is quite contrary to the positive accounting 
theory where such managers are expected to manage earnings upward in order to maintain expected debt-equity 
ratio to impress lenders. In Tunisia however, Lanouar et al (2013) found debt covenant to be positively 
associated with firms’ earnings management propensity. Hence rather than leverage being a deterrent to firms’ 
opportunistic behavior or earnings management according to Ramzi (2009), it motivates firms to according to 
Lanouar et al (2013) to be meddling with account information for hiding the reality and for personal gains. 
Mayor (1990) found that banks which are close to minimum capital requirements use earnings techniques such 
as overstating loan loss provisions, understating loan write-offs and recognizing abnormal realized gains on their 
investment portfolios, presumably so as not to breach the regulatory requirement. Studies have as well shown 
that almost half of the studied sample banks employed at least five out of seven methods of managing regulatory 
capital. Healy (1985) find that managers of firms with bonus incentive plan will carry out discretionary accruals 
to increase reported earnings thus increase their expected bonus. 
 
In summary therefore, many factors such as market capitalization, compensation contract based on share options, 
debt covenant, Loss deletion or cover and regulation have all influenced earnings management to some extent. 
However, these factors were all studied under the belief that market always prices discretion component of 
earnings correctly or otherwise. In a positive accounting theory of Watts and Zimmerman (1986), they are 
expected to yield positive results in an efficient and sensitive capital market. At present, Nigerian capital market 
are not only inefficient but also insensitive, which is an indication that investors and those who may have market 
connected compensation contract may have lost confidence in market pricing of share prices. Hence, we have to 
find out what actually drive their earnings management in a situation of market insensitivity to performance 
report and how the market abnormality interact with other non-market based drivers in explaining managers’ 
earnings management disposition. 
 
Statement of Hypotheses 
 
Based on the above review, we postulate the following hypotheses stated in the null. 
 
H1: Market capitalization does not negatively influence management’s desire to engage in discretion accounting 
in an insensitive capital market. 
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H2: Compensation contracting based on share options does not negatively influence earnings management in a 
market that is no longer sensitive. 
 
H3: Cash compensation based  on earnings target  contracting does not  significantly influence  banking    firms’ 
earnings management where capital market is insensitive to performance. 
 
H4: Debt covenant by banking firms does not significantly constitute an earnings management driver in an 
insensitive market. 
 
H5: The  Extent to  which  loss possibility drives  banks’  earnings  management  in  an  inefficiently  insensitive 
capital market is not significant and positive. 
 
H6: The extent regulation drives earnings management when the market goes insensitive is not significant and 
positive. 
 
3.1 Methodology and Data 
 
We made use of a cross-sectional survey research design and a quantitative research method. We made sure 
through our detailed questionnaires that respondents understood that earnings management is being carried out 
through accrual and real activity manipulation. The study spans across two significant periods in Nigeria market 
history. The first cross-section was the period between 2000 and 2008 when market was highly sensitive (Nwude 
2012), and the second section was the period between 2009 and 2014 when Nigerian capital market was highly 
insensitive and players bearish in nature. The period during when the capital was sensitive was assigned zero, 
otherwise, we assigned value 1. All data collected are therefore, reversed into figures. Questionnaires designed, 
which formed the instruments for our data collection take the likert forms with a 4-point scale ranging from 4, to 
1. The higher the value is the more the likelihood of the managers managing earnings in an insensitive market. 
The responses are paired to permit the use of logistic binary regression analysis through which we were able to 
establish maximum likelihood ratio of the presence of the drivers in earnings management over the classified 
periods. Maximum likelihood ascertains how many times success is likely than failure. Therefore, 4 and 3 
suggest ‘Yes’ or highly probable and we recoded them as 1 while 2 and 1 suggest ‘No’ or low possibility and we 
switched them off by recoding the responses to 0. The population of the study was 101 First Tier Security 
Company listed in the floor of the Nigerian Stock Exchange Market. We focused on the branches of those firms 
located within East-East geographical location in Nigeria. To be able to determine whether across the quoted 
firms, earnings management differs between highly and low quoted firms, we categorized the population into 
highly quoted and low quoted firms. Firms with current share prices of N20 and above were regarded as highly 
quoted share. This is because apart from being high-capitalized firms, deals on their shares are still reasonable. 
Low quoted firms are firms whose share prices are below N20. There are 25 firms that are highly quoted and 86 
low quoted firms listed among the first tier security companies by Nigerian stock exchange. We assigned value 1 
for highly quoted firms and 0 to low quoted firms. Within these firms, 2 respondents and 1 respondent from 
highly and low quoted firms respectively were randomly sampled. These respondents comprised directors, 
financial analysts and accountants directly connected with the preparation, interpretation and approval of 
financial statements for the firms sampled for study. In all, 136 questionnaires were distributed. To be able to 
determine the reliability of the primary data collected, the questionnaires were pretested. An item of the 
questionnaires ‘market-capitalization influences management desire to engage in discretion accounting in an 
insensitive capital market’ was pretested on 14 respondents with the aid of test-retest method, which tests the 
reliability of data. We found no issue as it affects the data reliability, given that the test yielded a significant and 
high-level coefficient Cronchbach Alpha of 0.98-a good fit for data reliability. Therefore, this indicates greater 
internal consistency of the scale, which signals par excellence in terms of reliability. The primary data collected 
were analyzed using multiple logistic regression analysis with the aid of Predictive Analytic Software. Logistic 
regression model expresses effects in the form of probabilities. In this case, the probability that EM is caused by 
market capitalization, share option compensation contract, cash based profitability target contract and other 
recognized variables in an insensitivity market was modeled using binary numbers 1 and 0. The probability (P) 
of success (the outcome of interest is present) was denoted by 1 and that of failure (the outcome of interest is 
absent) is 0. Based on the traditional Jones (1991) model, the likelihood of accrual management is given thus: 
 
= +1 +2 + €………………………..1 
TACC is change in total accrual, which is profit minus cash flow from operational activities. TAt-1 is the 
lagged  Total  Assets. REV  equals change  in  total sales  and  PPE represents Property Plant and    Equipment 
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Log[ 
+ +eit------ 
deflated by TAt-1, to fix heteroskedasticity problems. They are featured to capture manipulations of accrual 
based on depreciations/amortization and credit sales. € is the residual, which captures the discretional accrual. s 
are the coefficients of the variables. 
 
Therefore, from the above model, the normal discretionary accruals can be predicted thus: 
 
= +α1 +α2 ……………..………...2 
, and are predictors of β0, β1  and β2  from equation 1. NDACC equals non-discretionary accrual. The 
discretionary accrual is then determined by substituting the non-discretionary accruals from the total accruals for 
the target year using the coefficients from equation 2 above and the company specific data for the suspected year 
or event year. Therefore, the discretionary accrual is the difference between TA and NDACC. Since the 
emergence of Jones models, several studies particularly Dechow et al (1995), Ramzi (2009) Kothari et al (2005), 
Raman and Shahrur (2008) have modified it to permit the presence of other variables that can also affect accrual 
management. However, from this fundamental we apply logistic regression thus: 
 
Log [P( =1)]= +1 +2 +Ot+€…..3 
Log[P( =1)] is the probability that earnings management occurs due to the variables in the right hand   side 
of the equation. is the change in receivables introduced by Dechow et al (1995) to remove the   possibility 
of bias due to increase in sales that is not a function of accrual management, which the traditional Jones model 
omitted. Ot represents other factors that can drive earnings management behavior of managers apart from the 
fundamentals of the Jones model. The two fundamental variables Revenues (REV) and PPE naturally will have 
positive and negative effects on accruals respectively. Therefore, we do not need to test them in our study. Our 
emphasis will be on Ot. Since we are specifically using survey, we denote to be EM, which equals Y,  and 
the drivers of Y to be Oti, i takes values from 1 to n. N equals the number of variables to be considered. Oti is 
categorized into 1 and 0 for high and low quoted firms. In a logistic expression, the probability that Oti drives 
EM (Y) is written thus: 
Log[ ]=α0+βitOti+δ1 +€ ------------------------- 4 
The ratio Log[ ], which also equals e
α+X  
is the odd and defines how many times success is likely than 
not that market in this case influences managers’ accrual management. The symbol α0 is the constant while i, 
i=1,2,3..n is the vector of independent variable Oti1. δ1 is the coefficient of time invariant dummy variable which 
takes value 1 for period share prices or market is insensitive and 0 otherwise. Note however that although the 
expression looks like multiple linear regression, yet the method of determining the gradients of the variables in 
the equation is not the same with that of linear multiple regression. In a multiple logit (short term for logistic 
regression), the coefficients to be derived from the model show the change in the expected log odds in relation to 
a one-unit change in the independent variable controlling for other predictors. With this known and given the 
specific objectives of this study, our multiple logistic regression model holding all other fundamental drivers of 
Jones Model constant is specified thus: 
]=αit+1MCap
in  
+Ccshareopn  +Ccashopn  +Debtcn +Losscn +Regn 
-----6 
it 2 it 3 it 4 iti 5 iti 6 iti 
 
Where 
 
αit is the constant, to be set at zero. 1 is the gradient of market capitalization at the period of market   sensitivity. 
4 is the coefficient of compensation contract at insensitive period. 3 denotes the coefficient of cash option when 
market is insensitive. 4  is the coefficient of Debt covenant variable. 5 represents the coefficient for loss  cover. 
6 equals the gradient of the variable Reg. 7 is the year (yr) dummy variable coefficient that takes value 1 for an 
insensitive period otherwise 0. e is stochastic error. 
 
EM equal Earnings Management defined by discretionary accrual. It is a dependent variable. Although we did 
not make use of secondary data, the nature of the study permits that we should show how the dependent variable 
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it 
it 
(EM) is measured and communicated to the respondents to be sure they understand the concept very well as 
shown in both equation 1 and 2 above. 
MCap
n
 
 
is an independent variable that captures the effect of insensitive market capitalization on earnings 
management. 
CCshareop
n
 
 
 
is a compensating contract based on share options in an insensitive market. 
Cccashop
n 
represents compensation contract based on cash option payments in an insensitive capital market. 
Debtc
n  
is a variable that represents debt covenant. This variable is featured to capture the likelihood of firms’ 
embarking on earnings management in order to impress lenders or creditors, who may file for their repayment. 
Lossc
n 
is an explanatory variable representing loss cover-the probability of firms’ engaging in earnings 
management in order to avoid reporting loss that could damage their reputation. 
Reg
n 
is a variable for regulation. Some firms could engage in book cooking in order to circumvent some 
government regulations such as taxation affecting them. We consider the reality of this in an insensitive market. 
 
4.1 Results and Discussions 
 
Six questions were raised based on the main objective of this research. First, we shall examine the responses 
with references to the questions. Secondly, we shall after wards carry out the full real analysis based on the 
logistic regression output as shown in table 7. All the responses based on the questions are presented in table 1 
constituting sections 1 to 6. Subsequently, we would be referring to the table. We begin with the first question, 
which was asked thus: market-capitalization influence management desire to engage in discretion accounting in 
an insensitive capital market. Table 1 section 1 shows the responses to this question. Please kindly refer to the 
table. The result as shown in table below revealed that out of 147 questionnaires distributed, only 103 were 
returned. Out of these, 39 respondents (37.1% of the respondents) believed that market capitalization has no 
impact on earnings management of banking firms in an insensitive market. 51.4% constituting 54 respondents 
indicated that market value of shares has effect but on low scale. Respondents totaling 10 believe that market 
capitalization affects earnings management of corporate firms moderately or largely. This constitutes about 9.5% 
of the respondents. Judging from above, there could be poor presence of market stock prices in the creative 
accounting dispositions in an insensitive market. At extreme side of table 1 above, these responses are recoded 
into ‘yes’(1) and ‘no’(0) iteration. The table shows that 93 respondents believed that market capitalization 
measured by share prices has no bearing on earnings management in an insensitive market, while 10 were 
consenting to the presence of market capitalization on earnings management behavior of firms. 
 
The next research question was raised about the reality of earnings management and compensation contract 
based on share options. In this case the probing question was: compensation contracting based on share options 
influences earnings management in a market that is no longer sensitive. The responses to the above were 
presented in table 1 section 2 below. It appears it took similar dimension with outcome of question 1. This 
implies that market insensitive is negatively affecting earnings management of banking firm as the result 
displayed in table below shows that 43 respondents (41%) believe that share options based on targeted 
performance has no impact on earnings management of banking firms in an insensitive market. Respondents 
totaling 48 (46.6) indicated that share option although has effect on earnings market in a market insensitively yet 
on a low scale. Only 6 respondents believed that share options drive earnings management in an insensitive 
market on a moderate scale. Likewise, 6 respondents agreed that share options still drive earnings management 
largely as capital market goes stiff, but anyway is a very insignificant opinion. When these responses are recoded 
into ‘yes’(1) and ‘no’(0) iteration, 91 persons believed that compensation contract based on share options has no 
link with earnings management in an insensitive market, while 12 were saying yes to the presence of 
compensation contract based on shares. The full analysis of this result would be based on the regression analysis 
to be able to determine the maximum likelihood. 
 
The responses to question 3 as well gave us some clues regarding the reality of compensating contracting based 
on cash options and its presence in earnings management in an insensitive market. The question we specifically 
raised was that cash compensation based on earnings target-contracting influences banking firms’ earnings 
management where capital market is insensitive to performance. In response to the above question, 56  (54.4%) 
of our target respondents as presented in table 1 section 3, believed that cash compensation earnings target 
contract drives their earnings management in an sensitive market. Likewise, 19 respondents indicated that    cash 
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compensation based on targeted earnings drives creative accounting in insensitive market. However, 4 and 24 
respondents believed that cash compensation options have no and low effect on creative accounting in an 
insensitive market respectively. Recoding these responses into ‘yes’ and ‘no’ iteration, 28 persons believed that 
cash compensation contracting option has no link with earnings management in an insensitive market, while 75 
were saying yes to the presence of cash compensation performance contracting in earnings management. 
As it affects debt covenant and the likelihood of earnings management, we raised question 4 thus; debt covenant 
by corporate firms affect their propensity to manage earning in inefficient market. We analyzed the responses by 
both the quoted and unquoted firms below in table 1 section 4. The responses show that 1 and 7 persons 
responded that the debt covenant drove earnings management to no extent and low extent respectively. 26 
respondents believed debt covenant drove earnings management to a moderate extent while 67% of the 
respondents (69 respondents) believed debt covenant greatly determined earnings management in an insensitive 
market. Recoding these responses into on and off iteration, 8 persons believed that debt covenant has no bearing 
on earnings management in an insensitive market, while 95 were saying yes to the presence of debt covenant in 
earnings management. 
Question was also raised regarding the extent desire to avoid loss report motivates managers of banks to engage 
in earnings management. Here, the question was thus: loss possibility drives banks’ earnings management in an 
inefficiently insensitive capital market. Responses to this question are presented in table 1 section 5 below. The 
table shows that 63 constituting 60% responded that loss deletion is a driver of earnings management of banking 
firms in an insensitive market. Respondents totaling 23 believed that the loss variable although has influence on 
firms’ earnings management but on a moderate scale in an insensitive market. 16.5% indicated that loss deletion 
either has no or low effect on firms’ earnings management in an insensitive market. 
The final question we raised was: regulation drives earnings management when the market goes insensitive. The 
summary of the responses to this question are summarized in table 1 section 6 below. 
The responses from the table show that 66 respondents believed that regulation greatly drives earnings 
management. On a moderate scale, 22 respondents vote for the presence of regulation on earnings management 
among banking firm in an insensitive market. No respondent believes that regulation cannot drive earnings 
management. However, 15 still see regulation as having a low influence on earnings management. At extreme 
right-hand side of table 1 section 6, these responses are recoded into ‘yes’(1) and ‘no’(0) iteration. The table 
shows that 88 respondents said ‘Yes’ that regulation has a bearing on earnings management in an insensitive 
market, while 15 were saying ‘No’ to the presence of regulation in earnings management behavior of banking 
firms. 
Table 1: Survey of the Effects of the Presence Market Capitalization, Share options, Cash Options, Debt 
Covenant, Loss Covering and Regulation on Earnings Management in an Insensitive Capital Market 
Research Questions Responses Frequency Percent Cumulativ
e Percent 
Recoded Binary 
Responses 
Section 1 Market-capitalization 
influences management desire 
to engage in discretion 
accounting in an insensitive 
capital market 
1 39 37.9 37.9 NO=0 93 
2 54 52.4 90.3  
3 4 3.9 94.2 Yes=1 10 
4 6 5.8 100.0  
Total 103 100.0    
Section 2 Compensation contracting 
based on share price  or 
options influences earnings 
management in a  market that 
is no longer sensitive 
1 43 41.7 41.7 NO=0 91 
2 48 46.6 88.3 
3 6 5.8 94.2 Yes=1 12 
4 6 5.8 100.0 
Total 103 100.0   103 
Section 3 Cash compensation based on 
earnings target contracting 
influences banking firms’ 
earnings management where 
capital market is insensitive to 
performance 
1 4 3.9 3.9 NO=0 28 
2 24 23.3 27.2 
3 19 18.4 45.6 Yes=1 75 
4 56 54.4 100.0 
Total 103 100.0  103 
Section 4 Debt covenant by corporate 
firms affects their propensity 
to manage earning in 
inefficient market. 
1 1 1.0 1.0 NO=0 8 
2 7 6.8 7.8 
3 26 25.2 33.0 Yes=1 95 
4 69 67.0 100.0 
Total 103 100.0   103 
Source: Author 
European Journal of Business and Management 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.20, 2015 
www.iiste.org 
194 
 
 
Table 1 Continues: Survey of the Effects of the Presence Market Capitalization, Share options, Cash 
Options, Debt Covenant, Loss Covering and Regulation on Earnings Management in an Insensitive 
Capital Market 
Section 5 Loss possibility drives banks’ 
earnings management in an 
inefficiently insensitive 
capital market 
1 3 2.9 2.9 NO=0 17 
2 14 13.6 16.5 
3 23 22.3 38.8 Yes=1 86 
4 63 61.2 100.0 
Total 103 100.0   103 
Section 6 Regulation drives earnings 
management when the market 
goes insensitive 
1 15 14.6 14.6 NO=0 15 
2 22 21.4 36.0 Yes=1 88 
3 66 64.0 100.0 
Total 103 100.0   103 
Source: Author Using PASW 
 
4.1.2 Binary Logistic Regression Results 
We use the logistic regression result to test our hypotheses based on maximum likelihood ratio, direction of the 
impact, and significance of the effects as measured by Wald statistic. The result of the analysis is presented in 
table 7 below. We would be interpreting, discussing and testing the hypotheses at the same time. The logistic 
regression shows that the probability that market capitalization has influences on earnings management in an 
insensitive market is very low. P(EM=1) for Mcap, is 0.107. This is very low, and suggests that market 
capitalization in an insensitive capital market has little or no influence on banking firms’ creative accounting. 
This is also as proved by the negative sign of the impact. The negativity of the relationship shows that as market 
insensitivity increases, earnings management rate falls. We hypothesized that Market capitalization does not 
negatively influence management’s desire to engage in discretion accounting in an insensitive capital market and 
the maximum likelihood of the presence of market capitalization in earnings management is not low. From the 
result, the maximum likelihood or the probability (P(EM=1)/(1+P(EM=1)=0.107) is substantially less that 0.5 
bench mark. Moreover, the direction is negative. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. We conclude that 
Market capitalization negatively influenced management’s desire to engage in discretion accounting in an 
insensitive capital market and the maximum likelihood of the presence of market capitalization in earnings 
management is low. This finding is not consistent with the findings of Ramzi (2009), that size (market 
capitalization) has a positive relationship with earnings management. According to him, the larger the company, 
the more the corporate managers tend to adjust earnings upwards. In addition, the present study is inconsistent 
with the work of (Lanouar et al, 2013). This is since they found size or market capitalization to be positive, 
although significant. The divergence could stem from the fact that they investigated theirs under the framework 
of market sensitivity. Investors and bank directors should bear this in mind. First, they should rethink the drivers 
of earnings management especially as markets transits from sensitivity to insensitivity. Secondly, they should 
realize that this behavior has implication on the containment strategies. Obviously, many containment strategies 
were hinged on the fact fact that market capitalization has positive link with earnings management. Now that the 
relationship has changed, there is need to reevaluate the effectiveness of these containment factors in an 
insensitive market. Of course, in so doing, the likelihood of investors’ resource misallocation would be 
significantly minimized. Likewise, looking at compensation contracting based on share option and its 
relationship with earnings in an insensitive market, we can see that the effect is negative and the maximum 
likelihood is very low. The probability is 0.064. This shows that share options may not provide explanation for 
banking firms’ engaging in earnings management. Once more, this result is a negation of our hypothesis that 
compensation contracting based on share options does not negatively influence earnings management in a 
market that is no longer sensitive and its maximum likelihood is not low. We reject this null hypothesis and 
alternatively, accept the reality that compensation contracting based on share options negatively influences 
earnings management in a market that is no longer sensitive and its maximum likelihood is low. This result is 
inconsistent with the work of Toeh et al (1998) that the most significant motivations for earnings management 
for capital reasons is to encourage investment in a firm through offerings or options of stock. Our research lacks 
such evidence in an insensitive capital market, despite their claim that firms report positive unexpected accruals, 
which increase income before initial public offer, seasoned equity offers and stock-financed acquisitions. Our 
finding is also inconsistent with the work of Yermack (1997) that managers influence their compensation 
contracts by positively influencing earnings to include more options. Likewise, inconsistent with the findings of 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) that there is a positive correlation between earnings management and 
compensation contract based on shares and options, we discover negative relationship in an insensitive dummy 
market. This no doubt is good contribution to literature. However, the result also shows that compensation 
contracting Cash payment options significantly and positively influenced banks’ earnings management in an 
insensitive market. Cash contract performance payment increases even with market insensitivity. The reason is 
since  investors  would  not  like  to  tie  their  rewards  down  in  shares  that  are  not  increasing  in  value  with 
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performance reports. The maximum likelihood ratio is high leading to high probability (P=0.714) that cash based 
compensation contracting has a significant influence on banking firms’ earnings management. The outcome of 
the analysis therefore shows high probability function for the success of earnings management due to cash 
payment options. The null hypothesis that cash compensation based on earnings target contracting does not 
significantly influence banking firms’ earnings management where capital market is insensitive to performance 
and its maximum likelihood is not low is rejected. We accept the alternative that cash compensation based on 
earnings target contracting significantly influence banking firms’ earnings management where capital market is 
insensitive to performance and its maximum likelihood is high. 
 
In table 7 below, Loss cover is found to be a significant factor affecting earnings management in an insensitive 
capital market. The coefficient is positive and significant (=1.526, sig.val.<0.05). The result shows that loss 
covering is a driver of earnings management. We can infer that banks although are aware that loss report may 
not decrease their market influence, yet they would rather review earnings upwards rather than reporting loss. 
This could be to meet an analysts’ report and maintain a consistent reputation before investors and other 
stakeholders. As it affects the null hypothesis that the Extent to which loss possibility drives banks’ earnings 
management in an inefficiently insensitive capital market is not significant, positive and the likelihood ratio is 
not high is rejected. Since, the effect is significant, positive and the probability is high (0.82), we accept the 
alternative that the extent to which loss possibility drives firms’ earnings management in an inefficiently 
insensitive capital market is significant, positive, and the likelihood ratio is high. This is consistent with the 
findings of Roychowdhury (2006) that whenever result is close to zero, managers are motivated to manage 
earnings in order to prevent loss. Therefore, the findings of Lanouar et al (2013) based on Tunisian context that 
weak performance can motivate managers to manage earnings in order to make the weakness less visible is 
consistent with Nigerian context in an insensitive market. Moreover, debt covenant is found to be a positive and 
significant driver of banking firms’ earnings management in an insensitive market (=2.128, sig. val.<0.05). The 
maximum likelihood is 0.89, which is very high. The result implies that in order to impress creditors and then 
shift their desire to demand debt repayment, they can reengineer earnings positively. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis that debt covenant by banking firms does not significantly constitute an earnings management driver, 
the influence is not positive and the maximum likelihood of the debt covenant presence in earnings management 
is not high in inefficient market is rejected. The fact that debt covenant by banking firms significantly constitutes 
an earnings management driver the influence of which is positive and its maximum likelihood ist high in 
inefficient market is accepted. This is consistent with the finding of Xiong (2006), that firms who have a lot of 
debt have an incentive to manage earnings so that they do not breach their debt covenant. It also agrees with 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) that creditors often impose restrictions on the payment of dividends, share 
buybacks and the issuing of additional debt in terms of reported accounting figures and ratios, in order to ensure 
the repayment of the firms, borrowing. However, in terms of direction the present study is inconsistent with 
Ramzi (2009) that discovered the debt covenant has a negative although significant effect on earnings. 
Regulation has also has been revealed as having significant positive effect on earnings management in an 
insensitive market. The coefficient is positive and maximum likelihood that there is the presence of regulation in 
earnings management is high (=1.006; sig.Val.<0.05; P(EM=1)= Exp(B)/(1+ Exp(B)=0.73). The log odds of 
success is 2.733 times likely than not. This result contradict the null hypothesis that the extent regulation drives 
earnings management when the market goes insensitive is not significant, positive and the maximum likelihood 
of the presence of regulation as an earnings management driver in an insensitive capital market is low. We 
therefore accept otherwise. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of Collins et al (1995) that half of the 
banks sampled for study employed at least five out of seven methods of managing regulatory capital. The 
regulatory capital is adjusted through capitalization of expendable expenses, which in turn would result in profit 
and reserve increment. Hence, in both sensitive and insensitive market, banking firms, which are always under 
strict monitoring, try to evade some requirements by reviewing upwards their earnings. However, regulation 
such taxation can result in downward review of banking firms’ profitability. 
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Table 7: Binary Logistic Regression Table 
  
 
B 
 
 
S.E. 
 
 
Wald 
 
 
Df 
 
 
Sig. 
 
 
Exp(B) 
-2log 
Likelihood 
P(EM=1) 
Exp(B)/(1+ 
Exp(B)) 
Step 1
a 
MCap -2.120 .432 24.083 1 .000 .120 103.292 10.7% or 0.107 
Ccshareop -2.686 .597 20.256 1 .000 .068 99.946 6.4% or 0.064 
Cccashop .916 .296 9.595 1 .002 2.500 132.162
a
 71.4% or 0.714 
  
 
B 
 
 
S.E. 
 
 
Wald 
 
 
Df 
 
 
Sig. 
 
 
Exp(B) 
-2log 
Likelihood 
P(EM=1) 
Exp(B)/(1+ 
Exp(B)) 
Lossc 1.526 .349 19.130 1 .000 4.600 117.709
a
 82.% or 0.81 
Reg 1.006 .302 11.104 1 .001 2.733 130.241
a
 73 
Debtc 2.128 .473 20.238 1 .000 8.400 109.488 89.4% or 0.894 
Source: Author with the Aid of PASW. Data Used From Survey 
MCap= Market Capitalization; Ccshareop= Compensation contract share options; CcASHCOMP= Cash 
Compensation Options 
 
 
5.1 Conclusion and Recommendations 
The study of earnings management has indeed been very essential and relevant to earnings quality and investors’ 
resource management. From all ramifications, good knowledge of earnings management behavior of managers 
could help in enhancing earnings quality and standard setting. Based on the positive accounting theory, 
postulated with an underlying assumption of market efficiency and sensitivity, market capitalization and share 
options are seen as key and positive market–based drivers of earnings management among the corporate entities. 
Interestingly, various empirical findings seem to agree with this theory. Therefore, recommendations especially 
on its containment strategies were made with this theory and empirical studies in mind. However, it could boggle 
minds that in an insensitive market, these factors negatively relate with earnings management projecting low 
likelihood that they have any presence in earnings management. This sounds quite bizarre. However, that is the 
fact. Since this knowledge did not follow the popular discourse, we recommend that the earnings-management 
containment strategies of corporate firms be reviewed to ascertain and reconfirm the degree of their effectiveness 
in an insensitive capital market. Compensation contracting based on cash options, debt covenant, regulation and 
loss cover appeared with high odd ratios with probabilities function at upper ends implying that in an insensitive 
market the strength of managers to engage in the act of earnings management lies on these factors. They should 
be intercepted directly or indirectly to minimize or if possible to remove earnings management for optimal 
earnings quality and as a panacea for investors’ resource misallocation. 
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